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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The gang and gun violence reduction project implemented in Las Vegas consisted of three
components: hot spots deployment, focused deterrence, and place network investigations (PNI).
This report focuses on a program review and process evaluation of the PNI initiative.
The PNI strategy, also known as PIVOT (Place-based Investigations of Violent Offender
Territories), is grounded in crime science theory and research, which consistently finds that
crime is highly concentrated, and patterns of crime concentration generally persist in the same
locations over time despite repeated police intervention (Andresen, & Malleson, 2011; Braga,
Andresen, & Lawton, 2017; Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004, Wilcox & Eck, 2011).
The strategy was designed and first implemented in Cincinnati, Ohio. It is based on the
assumption that historical, or persistent, hot spots are the result of deeply entrenched crime place
networks used by active offender groups. The PNI strategy requires police investigations to
uncover crime place networks, and a local PNI Investigative Board to focus existing city/county
resources to alter crime-facilitating place dynamics (Madensen et al., 2017).
In early 2018, the LVMPD Command Staff, in consultation with the Director of Crime Analysis,
selected a pilot project site within the bureau’s Northeast Area Command (NEAC) for PNI
implementation. A specific condominium complex, small strip mall that housed a convenience
store, and nearby multi-family unit housing was selected to serve as the primary focus of the
intervention. The NEAC Captain assigned her FLEX (Flexible Deployment) team to implement
the PNI strategy and serve as the primary investigative unit. The International Association of
Chiefs of Police (IACP) / University of Cincinnati (UC) Center for Police Research and Policy
arranged to provide technical assistance and training to LVMPD’s PNI investigative unit. An
introductory training for investigators and internal/external partners was conducted in April
2018. On-going training and assistance were provided on a bi-weekly basis in the form of on-site
meetings or telecommunication with strategy experts and police personnel involved in
Cincinnati’s PNI implementation from May 1, 2018, until the end of the evaluation period (April
30, 2019).
In order to better understand the process and influence of the pilot PNI program in Las Vegas,
officials from LVMPD partnered with researchers from the Center for Police Research and
Policy, along with academic partners from the University of Nevada Las Vegas (UNLV) to
conduct a program review and process evaluation of the PNI initiative. Using bi-weekly
investigative activity summaries and LVMPD reported crime incident data, this study addresses
the following specific research questions:
1) What types of activities were conducted by the LVMPD PNI investigative unit in the
targeted violent hot spot? Given that PNI is a recently developed strategy, LVMPD and
other agencies interested in adopting the PNI strategy could benefit from systematic
documentation of investigative and enforcement activities conducted by investigative
units.
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2) What successes and obstacles were experienced by those responsible for implementing
the PNI strategy in Las Vegas? For the purpose of this evaluation, 11 specific
implementation dimensions (or general steps) were identified based on the process used
to conduct previous place network investigations in Cincinnati, Ohio. The current
assessment attempts to describe the general degree of program fidelity achieved by the
LVMPD during PNI strategy implementation.
3) What was the impact of the LVMPD PNI strategy on gun-related crime in the targeted
area? While the analysis presented within this evaluation is mostly exploratory in nature,
given the relatively short intervention period and low overall crime numbers, it offers
insight into how the PNI strategy, as implemented by the LVMPD, could impact violent
crime targeted areas.
Our interpretation of the program review and process evaluation findings can best be
summarized as follows:
1) The program review identified four general PNI investigative and response activities: (1)
surveillance and intelligence gathering, (2) external agency coordination and partnership
building, (3) effecting changes to physical locations and in place management practices,
and enforcement actions. The LVMPD PNI investigative unit was highly productive in
establishing partnerships and implementing place-based changes to alter violencefacilitating dynamics, which if effective, will lessen the need for future traditional police
response or justice system intervention.
2) The LVMPD PNI investigative unit developed systems and processes that allowed
implementation of the vast majority of PNI strategy elements. The process evaluation
found that PNI model compliance was high. The unit addressed each implementation step
through their investigative actions. The unit also improved PNI strategy processes across
several implementation dimensions (e.g., innovative surveillance tactics, creative
intelligence sharing processes).
3) To improve PNI strategy processes and effectiveness, the most critical recommended
actions fall within four categories:
1. Leverage the influence of a project champion at the highest rank possible
2. Conduct additional formal analyses and intelligence gathering prior to site
selection and throughout the PNI project
3. Assign additional dedicated personnel to the PNI investigative unit
activities (e.g., crime analyst, legal personnel, project manager)
4. Establish a formal PNI Investigative Board led by city/county government
representatives
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4) Although project limitations did not permit a comprehensive outcome evaluation, postintervention changes in numbers of crime incidents (-39.1% in 12-month postintervention period) suggest that the PNI strategy may have contributed to a decrease in
gun-related violent crime the in targeted site.
The current evaluation findings suggest at least three policy implications:
1) PNI, as implemented in Las Vegas, holds promise for reducing gun-related crime and
improving community safety. PNI investigative team activities appear to have
significantly altered place dynamics to decrease violence, as evidenced by available
crime data, site observations, and discussions with property employees conducted by the
research team.
2) To enhance PNI strategy effectiveness and further lessen reliance on traditional criminal
justice interventions, it is recommended that LVMPD work to establish a standing PNI
Investigative Board before replicating this strategy in additional sites.
3) It will be necessary to implement the program across multiple sites for a sufficient period
of time to fully assess the impact of the PNI strategy on gun-related violent crime. Postintervention assessment periods should be designed to consider the lagged effect of PNI
strategy interventions.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In spring of 2017, researchers from the IACP/UC Center for Police Research and Policy (the
“Center”) met with the command staff from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD) to discuss their concerns related to violent crime. After a review of LVMPD’s
historical and current methods of handling violent crime, it was decided that Center researchers
would design, implement, and evaluate a strategy with the LVMPD to address gun and gang
member involved (GMI) violence. Specifically, a three-prong approach was developed, which
included: (1) hot spots policing to reduce GMI street violence; (2) focused deterrence efforts to
reduce GMI offending and victimization; and (3) place network investigations (PNI) to identify
and disrupt the infrastructures that support GMI violent activities. When used in combination,
these interventions work to address all three elements of the crime triangle: offenders, victims,
and places.
This report provides the findings specifically for the place network investigations (PNI) portion
of this violence reduction project. Two additional, separate reports document the findings for the
hot spots policing initiative, and the focused deterrence violence reduction intervention. The PNI
strategy involved the assignment of an investigative unit into a historically violent hot spot
within LVMPD’s jurisdiction. The PNI investigative unit worked in both overt and covert
capacities to uncover places used by offenders to carry out illegal activities within and
immediately adjacent to the selected hot spot. Investigators used police enforcement efforts and
community partnerships to block opportunities for crime in locations identified as part of a crime
place network. The PNI activities began in May 2018, and investigative unit members reported
their activities for a 12-month period for the purpose of documentation and review.
The PNI strategy, also known as PIVOT (Place-based Investigations of Violent Offender
Territories)1, was first developed and piloted by the Cincinnati (Ohio) Police Department. The
strategy was implemented in two Cincinnati neighborhood hot spots in 2016 in response to high
numbers of shootings across the city during the previous year. Cincinnati officers uncovered and
dismantled crime place networks using an investigative unit who identified criminogenic
locations and reported investigative findings on a biweekly basis to local government leaders.
These government leaders then leveraged city department resources to disrupt violencefacilitating place dynamics. By 2017, the PNI strategy had been implemented in three additional
sites. Recent analyses reveal that, across all five sites, the number of shooting victims declined
by 72.46% over a two-year period, with 69 shooting victims reported during the pre-evaluation

1

In this report, the acronym PNI (Place Network Investigations) is used interchangeably with PIVOT (Place-based
Investigations of Violent Offender Territories) and both represent the same crime reduction strategy. While the
Cincinnati Police Department and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department labeled their place network
investigations PIVOT, the acronym PNI has been recently adopted to avoid confusion between this strategy and
other non-similar violence reduction strategies that have adopted the PIVOT acronym (e.g., PIVOT to Peace in
Louisville, Kentucky, or Atlanta, Georgia’s PIVOT gunshot hospital intervention program).
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24-month period, and 19 shooting victims reported during the post-evaluation 24-month period
(Hammer, 2020).
The PNI strategy is grounded in crime science theory and research, which consistently finds that
crime is highly concentrated, and patterns of crime concentration generally persist in the same
locations over time despite repeated police intervention (Braga, Andresen, & Lawton, 2017;
Andresen, & Malleson, 2011; Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, & Yang, 2004). The strategy was
designed based on the assumption that historical, or persistent, hot spots are the result of deeply
entrenched crime place networks used by active offender groups. Although Cincinnati
investigators found evidence of crime place networks in historical hot spots and successfully
reduced shooting-related violence by changing place dynamics within these networks, it remains
to be seen whether similar networks will be found within hot spots in other jurisdictions. Further,
there has been no attempt to systemically document the activities of PNI investigators.2 We have
yet to determine the range or styles of interventions used to effectively uncover crime place
networks. Finally, we have no evidence concerning how differing degrees of program
implementation might affect the strategy’s effectiveness. We have not yet determined if program
fidelity, when judged against the strategy as originally designed, impacts violence reduction
outcomes. This report examines the process of PNI implementation by the LVMPD.
The City of Las Vegas is the most populated city in the State of Nevada with an estimated
population of 644,000 people. The city has grown by about 10% since 2010 and has an estimated
median household income of $53,000. In terms of racial/ethnic composition of the population,
approximately 62.7% are White, 12.2% are Black, 6.7% are Asian and 6.2% are two or more
races or of other races; approximately 32.7% of the population are of Hispanic or Latino descent
(US Census Bureau, 2019). Las Vegas is most well-known for its tourism attractions, and
therefore has a fairly transient population in comparison to other large cities in the United States.
The city experiences a tourist volume of approximately 42 million visitors each year (LVMPD,
2019).
The City of Las Vegas is situated within Clark County, Nevada, which has a population of
approximately 2.23 million people. The county has grown by approximately 14% from 2010 to
2018 and has an estimated median household income of $56,000. In terms of racial/ethnic
composition of the population, approximately 69.9% are White, 12.8% are Black, 10.4% are
Asian and 6.9% are two or more races or of other races (US Census Bureau, 2019). In addition,
approximately 31.4% of the population is of Hispanic or Latino descent. Overall, the City of Las
Vegas and the larger surrounding Clark County have fairly similar demographics.
The Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) provides all policing services for the
City of Las Vegas and Clark County, Nevada (excluding the cities of Henderson, North Las

2

One recent exception to this can be found in Hammer (2020); some activities were also briefly described in the
Cincinnati Police Department’s (2017) submission for the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in ProblemOriented Policing.
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Vegas, Boulder City, and Mesquite). The LVMPD was formed by the incorporation of separate
police agencies in Clark County in July of 1973 and is led by the Sheriff of Clark County, who is
publicly elected every four years. The LVMPD is the largest police department in the State of
Nevada, with 3,200 sworn police officers and 1,300 civilian employees. In addition, the LVMPD
has approximately 1,200 personnel devoted to detention services. According to the most recent
estimates (N=5,832), approximately 33.6% of the LVMPD is comprised of female employees
and 66.4% of the agency is comprised of male employees (LVMPD, 2019). In terms of the
LVMPD’s ethnic composition, approximately 61.5% of employees are White, 16.9% are
Hispanic, 10.0% are Black, 5.7% are Asian, and 5.9% are of mixed races or of other ethnicities.
In total, the LVMPD serves a geographic jurisdiction of 7,500 square miles, with a population of
approximately 1.6 million—more than half of the population of the state of Nevada (LVMPD,
2019). The LVMPD is divided into nine urban area commends: Bolden, Convention Center
(which includes the Las Vegas Strip and Convention Center), Downtown, Northeast, Northwest,
Southeast, Spring Valley, Enterprise and South Central. The PNI violence reduction project was
specifically implemented within the LVMPD’s Northeast Area Command.
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II.

PLACE NETWORK INVESTIGATIONS (PNI)

The PNI strategy is grounded in the assumption that crime is not random, and police resources
can be directed to disrupt crime concentrations (Spelman & Eck, 1989). A large evidence base
confirms that crime concentrates across places, victims, and offenders. This evidence has
prompted police administrators to adopt focused policing strategies; for example, hot spots
policing in high-crime places, initiatives to protect high-risk victims, and repeat offender
deterrence strategies. The importance of the place-crime connection, in particular, is widely
acknowledged by both researchers and practitioners. Early research reported that just three
percent of addresses in Minneapolis, Minnesota accounted for 50% of calls for service in a given
year (Sherman, Gartin, & Buerger, 1989), and this finding has been replicated and supported by
decades of subsequent research reporting similar patterns of crime concentrations across multiple
types of places and units of analysis (see Weisburd, Groff, & Yang, 2012).
Researchers and practitioners have found much success in reducing violence by employing
focused deterrence strategies that disrupt offender networks. Using social network analysis,
police identify and target specific offenders for enhanced deterrence efforts or incapacitation.
Research evidence suggests that interventions targeting offender networks can lead to substantial
reductions in violence across cities (Braga & Weisburd, 2012). While we know that police
interventions targeting individual high-crime places can significantly reduce crime at particular
locations (Braga & Weisburd, 2010; Sherman & Weisburd, 1995; Weisburd, 1997), recent
theoretical advances suggest that, like offenders, places might function together as part of a
larger network.
A recent hypothesis proposed by those responsible for developing the PNI violence reduction
strategy is that crime place networks provide the “infrastructure” needed to operate illicit
markets. Locations that form crime place networks lack effective place management (see Eck
1994). Violent incidents result from offender interactions that take place at these unmanaged
locations as they engage in activities related to the operation of illicit markets (e.g., drug,
weapon, or human trafficking).
While crime maps depict places where crime occurs, crime place networks include at least three
other types of locations used by offenders that do not always or regularly come to the attention of
police. Drawing from recent advances in crime place theory (Felson, 2003; Hammer, 2011;
Madensen & Eck, 2013), the PNI strategy attempts to uncover four types of places (CS4) that
constitute crime place networks:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Crime Sites—specific places where crime occurs
Convergent Settings—public places where offenders routinely meet
Comfort Spaces—private meeting, staging, and supplying locations
Corrupting Spots—places that encourage criminal activity in other locations

Given that police data reflect only places where crime occurs (i.e., crime sites), the other three
locations in crime place networks – convergent settings, comfort spaces, and corrupting spots –
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often remain hidden without targeted police investigations. These investigations and subsequent
efforts to dismantle crime place networks form the basis of the PNI strategy.
Figure 1 depicts a crime place network uncovered by the co-developer of the PNI strategy in
2013, while serving as a district commander in Cincinnati. One of the city’s most violent crime
sites was an apartment building with a gang-run, open-air drug market operating just south of the
building. A corner market and an area surrounding a community landmark functioned as two
public convergent settings where gang members would regularly meet. Nearby private residences
provided supply and staging locations and were used as private comfort spaces. An adjacent strip
mall contained businesses suspected of accepting stolen goods and laundering money, which
allowed these locations to serve as corrupting spots within the network.
The drug market offender network was identified and disrupted using a focused deterrence
strategy, and key gang members were arrested. Extensive resources were dedicated to making
environmental and management changes at the apartment building (crime site). Although the
district commander was able to reduce violent crime, the reduction was short-lived, and violence
returned to – and eventually exceeded – previous crime levels. The drug market remained active
since the larger crime place network remained intact. The importance of place networks was
largely unrecognized at the time. The PNI strategy was developed in an attempt to address these
and other shortcomings of traditional enforcement and place-focused strategies.
Figure 1: Crime Place Network (Source: Madensen et al., 2017)
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The PNI strategy follows the SARA model of problem-solving, which includes four phases:
scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (Clarke & Eck, 2005), to uncover and address
crime place networks. Figure 2
depicts the general strategy phases
Figure 2: PNI Strategy Phases
and related objectives.
PHASE 1

Identify Persistent

Violent Locations
In the first phase, analyses are
conducted to determine how and
where gun violence clusters across
Investigate
Investigate Crime
PHASE 2
the jurisdiction. In Cincinnati,
Offender Networks
Place Networks
analyses revealed that more than 40
percent of all shooting victims were
City-Wide Effort to
shot within 23 geographically small
PHASE 3
Disrupt Networks
areas, called micro-locations. These
micro-locations spanned
approximately two square blocks and
Monitor & Sustain
PHASE 4
made up only 1.4 percent of the
Crime Reductions
city’s land mass. Further analysis
revealed that violent crime and officer injuries were also disproportionately concentrated in these
locations (Cincinnati Police Department, 2017).

The second phase involves investigations of offender and crime place networks. Offender
networks can be investigated and addressed through complimentary strategies (e.g., focused
deterrence). The PNI strategy requires officers to study offender movement patterns and
ownership/management practices in and around known crime sites. Table 1 describes
investigative techniques used by PNI officers to uncover locations within crime place networks
in Cincinnati.
Table 1: Investigative Techniques Used to Uncover Crime Place Networks
Intelligence
 Conduct intelligence briefings with beat officers, detectives, specialized units (e.g., violent crime,
gang, vice, homicide), crime analysts, all city departments, and community members, including
community service personnel (e.g., postal service), to identify key players and places involved in
possible network activities.
 Gather intelligence from municipal, state, and federal databases on historical place violations and
ownership connections among places.
Surveillance
 Video and photograph the initial and changing physical characteristics and social dynamics of key
places.
 Conduct ongoing surveillance of place and offender activities (e.g., temporary surveillance
cameras, undercover officers).
Information Sources and Confidential Informants
 Develop internal and external confidential informants to investigate place activities (e.g., security
personnel, management personnel, labor contractors, existing CIs).
 Train confidential informants to gather place-based intelligence (e.g., manager
involvement/knowledge of illicit activities, offender movement among places).
Source: Madensen et al., 2017
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Once locations within a crime place network are identified, the third phase involves biweekly
meetings with a citywide PNI Investigative Board. The PNI Investigative Board consists of
representatives from various city departments and community organizations. Board members
hold leadership roles and can leverage resources within their respective departments and
organizations. The board reviews investigator findings, and members provide additional
information about the identified locations from their respective departments/agencies. The board
can dismantle the place network through various means, including using legal remedies to revoke
business licenses, requiring new management practices, mandating employee training, ordering
owners into court-mandated receivership, requiring changes to the physical design of a building,
or, ultimately, ordering complete property abatement. The board can also prioritize city resources
to more quickly address crime-facilitating places (e.g., schedule building demolitions, reroute
traffic patterns, initiate redevelopment projects). Table 2 provides examples of agencies and
organizations who contributed to the Cincinnati PNI Investigative Board and the types of
resources that can be leveraged to disrupt crime place networks.
Table 2: PNI Investigative Board Responses
City Department
Fire

Disruption Techniques

Traffic/Engineering
Community Improvement
Organizations
Buildings
Health
Port Authority
Treasury
Parks & Recreation
Non-profit Redevelopment
Groups
Public Services
Human Relations Commission
























Eliminate hazards (e.g., remove illegal scrap yard)
Fire code violations fines/arrests
Street redesign (e.g., traffic calming, closures)
Adding/removing signage
Private property consultations (e.g., graffiti removal)
Adding fencing or public space definition markers
Parking spaces, dumpster placement/organization
Execute vacate orders
Removal of illegal kitchens or vendors
Address lead paint in buildings
Building demolitions
Initiate large-scale redevelopment projects
Permit revocation (e.g., illegal dance halls)
Citations for non-licensed activities (e.g., gaming)
Redesign or development of park spaces
Removal of dilapidated playground equipment
Purchase vacated properties
Help community leaders secure low-income housing
Foliage removal, community clean-up efforts
Altering trash pick-up schedules
Advocacy and offender desistance outreach
Job and social services messaging

Adapted from: Madensen et al. 2017

A coordinated all-city response provides additional leverage, resources, and intervention options
to effectively dismantle deeply entrenched crime-place networks – the source of persistent and
chronic hot spots. PNI interventions block crime activities by changing the way in which places
are managed and used. Interventions might involve altering parking restrictions or traffic patterns
12

along a road commonly used in drive-by shootings or seizing and repurposing a corner store
laundering money for a violent drug market. A focus on place networks, rather than individual
crime sites, roots out the larger infrastructure offenders retreat to and then reemerge from once
police resources are deployed elsewhere.
Once the crime place network has been dismantled (i.e., opportunities for violence have been
blocked or place dynamics that facilitate violence have been altered at identified locations),
phase four begins. In phase four, crime levels continue to be monitored, community resources
are organized by the PNI Investigative Board or other local community councils and
organizations, and organic neighborhood-led redevelopment can begin in the absence of
persistently high levels of violence. This redevelopment makes the reestablishment of crime
place networks less likely with the introduction of additional or more effective management at
nearby places.
The PNI violence reduction strategy is similar to other successful problem-focused policing
projects in at least three ways. First, PNI focuses attention on a specific problem (i.e., shootings)
and calls for detailed analysis of place conditions that facilitate similar harmful events (see
Clarke & Eck, 2005). Second, PNI focuses attention on criminogenic places. A vast body of
evidence suggests that a small number of risky facilities (Clarke & Eck, 2007; Eck, Clarke and
Guerette, 2007) or individual crime generators and attractors (Brantingham and Brantingham,
1995) account for the majority of crime in any hot spot. Third, the PNI strategy also promotes
“shifting and sharing of responsibility” (Scott and Goldstein, 2005; Scott, 2005) for solving
crime problems. Place managers are held accountable for harms that occur on their properties.
Responsibility is also shifted to “super-controllers” (Sampson, Eck and Durham, 2010) who
control local government resources. Like most other successful crime reduction initiatives, the
success of PNI requires strong leadership and participation on the part of local government (see
Plant and Scott, 2009).
The PNI strategy is different from traditional policing strategies in at least three ways. First, this
is one of the first place-based strategies to acknowledge that violent micro-locations are
dangerous places for police. In Cincinnati, officer injuries and suspect behaviors that lead to
officer injuries (e.g., resisting arrest) were also disproportionately concentrated in the identified
violent micro-locations. Thus, persistently violent hot spots are risky for both residents and
officers who respond to these locations. Second, PNI focuses on how places function as crimefacilitating networks. Long-term crime reduction is achieved by dismantling the entire physical
infrastructure used by offenders, beyond places where crime occurs (crime sites). Trained
investigators uncover connected networks of offender-used places that cannot be identified
through calls-for-service analyses alone. These places include public and private locations used
by offenders to plan and carry out crime (also known as convergent settings and comfort spaces),
as well as businesses that facilitate crime markets (referred to as corrupting spots). Third, PNI
leverages all city resources to dismantle crime-place networks. Championed by the mayor and/or
city manager, PNI investigators regularly present their findings to other city department
managers (e.g., representatives from departments like Traffic and Engineering, Buildings and
Inspections, and the city solicitor), who can often be much better suited to design and implement
place-focused crime prevention interventions than police.
13

Early results from Cincinnati’s PNI initiative appear promising. The pilot sites selected by CPD
experienced significant reductions in violence during the first year (over 89 percent in the first
site and 71 percent in the second site), and the agency reports that violence remains historically
low in these areas more than three years after intervention. By 2017, the PNI strategy had been
implemented in three additional sites in Cincinnati. Recent analyses reveal that, across all five
sites, the number of shooting victims declined by 72.46% over a two-year period, with 69
shooting victims reported during the pre-evaluation 24-month period, followed by 19 shooting
victims reported during the post-evaluation 24-month period (Hammer, 2020).
In addition to early promising evaluation results, at least five other benefits have been associated
with the PNI strategy (Herold & Eck, 2020). The PNI strategy:
1. aligns with evidence-based crime science principles;
2. lessens reliance on police suppression tactics that, while often immediately effective in
driving down crime numbers, continually put officers at risk, offer short-lived crime
reductions, are costly, and often harm police-community relations;
3. works well with offender-based strategies by finding “hidden” locations where high-level
players in violent offender networks operate, thus concentrating justice system resources
on impactful, targeted arrests;
4. asks officers to engage in investigations (policework) and government leaders to better
organize and reprioritize existing city resources, rather than acquire new resources; and
5. provides conditions for organic neighborhood redevelopment by promoting community
resiliency.
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III.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary purpose of implementing the PNI strategy in Las Vegas was to – in combination
with other strategies – reduce gang-member involved violence. LVMPD analysts had previously
linked shooting violence in Las Vegas with gang activity. Thus, implementation of PNI in a
location historically marked by high levels of gun-related crime was hypothesized to reduce
gang-member involved violence in the target location. However, given that PNI had been
implemented in only one other jurisdiction, the LVMPD agreed to attempt PNI implementation
in a single pilot site to assess potential effects, but with the understanding that it was unlikely to
have a substantial impact on crime outside of the boundaries of treatment location. For this
reason, the primary focus of the evaluation was not on crime-related outcome measures, although
these are reported. Instead, the primary goal of the current evaluation is to review the PNI
program, as implemented by the LVMPD, and offer a cursory process evaluation to determine
the degree to which the agency was able to implement specific elements of the program.
Specifically, this review was designed to address the following three related key research
questions:
1) Program Review. What types of activities were conducted by the LVMPD PNI
investigative unit in the targeted violent hot spot? Given that PNI is a recently developed
strategy, LVMPD and other agencies interested in adopting the PNI strategy could
benefit from systematic documentation of investigative and enforcement activities
conducted by investigative units. While many violence reduction evaluations report
outcomes associated with specific crime reduction initiatives, few sufficiently describe
the specific activities used to achieve these outcomes (see Famega, Hinkle, & Weisburd,
2017). For replication purposes, and to better understand the causes associated with PNI
outcomes, this initiative describes and provides a typology of interventions used by the
PNI investigative unit.
2) Process Evaluation. What successes and obstacles were experienced by those
responsible for implementing the PNI strategy in Las Vegas? For the purpose of this
evaluation, 11 specific implementation dimensions (or general steps) were identified
based on the process used to conduct previous place network investigations in Cincinnati,
Ohio. A wide variety of factors can influence model adherence, including available
agency resources, investigator/supervisor training, internal unit coordination, analytic
capabilities, local government engagement, and cooperation by outside agencies and
community organizations. The current assessment attempts to describe the general degree
of program fidelity achieved by the LVMPD during PNI strategy implementation.
3) Impact on Gun-related Crime. What was the impact of the LVMPD PNI strategy on
gun-related crime in the targeted area? It remains to be seen whether the crime reduction
successes observed in Cincinnati can be replicated in other jurisdictions. Further, it is
unknown whether full program implementation, as measured by the 11 implementation
dimensions, is needed to achieve similar outcomes. While the analysis presented within
this evaluation is mostly exploratory in nature, given the relatively short intervention
15

period and low overall crime numbers, it provides partial insight into how the PNI
strategy, as implemented by the LVMPD, could impact violent crime targeted areas.
Our study methodology and statistical analyses used to examine these research questions are
presented in the sections below.
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IV.

METHODOLOGY

Project Implementation
In May 2017, researchers from the IACP/UC Center met with the LVMPD’s Director of Crime
Analysis and Command Staff to discuss PNI strategy objectives and select a suitable project
implementation site. The following were among the primary strategy objectives discussed by the
research team and LVMPD personnel:


Reduce gun-related violence (often tied to gang violence) by altering place dynamics in
persistent violent locations.



Target crime-facilitating infrastructures by identifying existing crime place networks that
gang members could use to carry out illegal and harmful activities.



Refocus existing police resources/strategies to investigate and address both crime place
networks and offenders.



Establish coordinated/formal partnerships, both internal and external to LVMPD, to
leverage additional resources to eliminate crime infrastructures.

The LVMPD command staff elected to pilot test the strategy in a single location and committed
to assigning an investigative unit to the project for a minimum of 12 months.
Intervention Site
In early 2018, the LVMPD Command Staff, in consultation with the Director of Crime Analysis,
selected a project site within the bureau’s Northeast Area Command (NEAC) for PNI
implementation. A specific condominium complex, small strip mall that housed a convenience
store, and nearby multi-family unit housing was selected to serve as the primary focus of the
intervention. Site selection was based on the following four criteria:
1. the location was considered a persistent hot spot within the NEAC;
2. a gang shooting involving a 16-year-old recently occurred at the complex and received
considerable media and public attention;
3. the NEAC Captain had strong relationships with internal and external partners who
could assist with the project – including the County Commissioner; and
4. other social services projects being conducted in the area (e.g., Pathway from Poverty)
were seen as complimentary to PNI objectives and personnel believed these resources
could be leveraged to achieve long-term sustainability in crime reductions.
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The condominium complex was previously an apartment complex that consisted of individual
430 units. Each unit was sold to individual owners when the property was transformed into
condominiums. Although governed by an HOA, the combination of individual ownership,
owners who lived outside of Las Vegas, and high numbers of transient renters presented
obstacles to previous police interventions. Similarly, the nearby multi-family housing included
58 fourplex buildings were also individually owned and often rented by owners who did not live
in or near the buildings.
The selected PNI location is situated in the northeast area of LVMPD’s Las Vegas jurisdiction.
The location is in close proximity to Nellis Air Force Base.3 Figure 3 depicts the project site
location within the larger Las Vegas valley.
Figure 3: PNI Site Location

3

The distance between the PNI site and the Nellis Air Force Base is approximately 1.3 miles.
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LVMPD’s PNI Investigative Unit
The NEAC Captain assigned her FLEX (Flexible Deployment) team to implement the PNI
strategy and serve as the primary investigative unit. The LMVPD PNI investigative unit
consisted of a supervisory Sergeant, with extensive investigative experience, and a team of
officers. Typically, four to six officers were assigned at any given time to the unit. As personnel
changes were made during the duration of the project, officers were selected based on their
desire to gain investigatory experience and interest in learning to conduct place network
investigations. The PNI investigative unit Sergeant and his team provided regular briefings to the
NEAC Captain.
Technical Assistance and Training
Researchers from the IACP/UC Center arranged to provide technical assistance and training to
LVMPD’s PNI investigative unit. An introductory training for investigators and internal/external
partners (e.g., LVMPD’s Special Investigations Section, Parole and Probation) was conducted in
April 2018.4 The introductory training covered general place-crime principles and evidence
supporting the use of place network investigations, as well as examples of investigation
techniques and partnerships found to be effective in addressing crime facilitating dynamics at
places. On-going training and assistance were provided on a bi-weekly basis in the form of onsite meetings or telecommunication with strategy experts and police personnel involved in
CPD’s PNI implementation. This assistance provided the LVMPD PNI unit with information
regarding effective place network investigatory tactics and evidence-based place interventions
associated with violence crime reduction.
Data and Analysis
Qualitative and quantitative data were analyzed to describe and evaluate the implementation and
impact of the PNI strategy. Specifically, we reviewed bi-weekly investigative activity summaries
and LVMPD reported crime incident data. For the purpose of examining investigative work to
inform the program review and process evaluation, the investigative activity summaries were
reviewed to identify discrete investigative tactics employed by the PNI unit and activities related
to the 11 dimensions associated with PNI model adherence (see Table 3). These dimensions were
identified based on the processes used to implement PNI by Cincinnati’s PNI strategy
development and investigative unit.
For the purpose of evaluating the impact of the strategy on gun-related crime, the following
crime categories were examined:


4

assault with a deadly weapon;

The PNI strategy co-creator, Tamara Herold, developed and led this training.
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battery (excluding misdemeanor);



murder and attempted murder;



robbery and attempted robbery; and



shooting.

As described in the findings section that follows, the number of gun-related crime incidents
documented during the treatment period (May 1, 2018 – Apr 30, 2019) were compared to the
number of gun-related crime incidents that occurred during the year prior to intervention. The
12-month to 12-month comparison allowed the analysis to control for seasonal effects.
Table 3: Dimensions of PNI Model Adherence
Implementation Steps
Select violent micro-locations
Select and train PNI unit
Establish and follow investigative protocols
Establish, train, and gain compliance from PNI Investigative Board members
Gather pre-intelligence
Assess and establish intelligence systems
Conduct internal intelligence sessions
Collect community intelligence
Present intelligence products to PNI Investigative Board
Identify offender and crime place networks
Disrupt offender and crime place networks
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V.

FINDINGS

This section describes outcomes associated with the program review, process evaluation, and
analysis of the PNI strategy’s impact on gun-related crime.
Program Review
The following program review provides a snapshot of the investigative and
enforcement/compliance tactics used by the LVMPD PNI investigative unit in the
implementation site. Although not exhaustive, this review of PNI activities provides a general
overview of the tactics used to uncover and address crime place networks.
Four general investigative and response activities were identified:


surveillance and intelligence gathering;



external agency coordination and partnership building;



effecting changes to physical locations and in place management practices; and



enforcement actions.

Numerous surveillance and intelligence gathering methods were used to uncover an existing
crime place network. Direct site observations were conducted through overt and covert
investigator surveillance. Resident and business owner/manager interviews and surveys were
conducted throughout the project period. Sources of information (e.g., postal workers, security
personnel) and confidential informants were used to gather additional place-specific intelligence.
Calls placed by arrestees in detention facilities and social media sites were monitored. Persons
arrested in the PNI site were later interviewed by investigators. Property and crime data records
were analyzed to identify place-offender connections. Pen registers5 and GPS monitoring were
used to analyze offender movement patterns between locations. Intelligence bulletins were
created to facilitate information sharing between internal LMVPD personnel and units.
Coordination with external agencies generated additional intelligence concerning offenders and
places in the PNI site. PNI investigators worked with the Gaming Control Board and Business
Licensing investigators and personnel to investigate local business practices. Additional
intelligence was gathered through meetings with IRS investigators, HUD representatives, the
Attorney General’s Office, and Nevada Real Estate Division personnel. Coordination with a
local constable led to resident education concerning eviction rights to stem illegal eviction
practices.

5

A pen register allows officers to record all numbers called from a specific phone line.
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Physical and place management changes were made to alter dynamics in crime place network
locations. Additional cameras, license plate readers, additional lighting, removal of business
window obstructions, and new access controls were added to network locations. In partnership
with HOA representatives, PNI investigators assisted in making substantial changes to the
condominium bylaws. HOA bylaws were revised to require owners to provide updated tenant
information 10 days prior to move-in, and new regulations instituted a $5,000 fine leveraged
against owners of properties subjected to SWAT raids finding evidence of illegal activities.
Enforcement action was taken against known offenders, as well as businesses and property
owners/managers of places identified as part of the crime place network. A case was built and
filed against a problematic property manager who facilitated illegal activities across multiple
housing units. Controlled drug buys identified key offenders operating in the area. Targeted
arrests were made as a result of operations with Parole and Probation. Businesses were cited and
fined for illegal practices. Surveillance operations with internal (e.g., Special Investigations
Section) and external (e.g., Gaming Control Board) partners led to citations for health violations
and illegal security practices.
Process Evaluation
The following process evaluation serves to identify the degree to which the LVMPD PNI project
was implemented as designed by the Cincinnati PNI team. It is important to note that multiple
explanations exist for model non-adherence, including differences in available agency resources,
investigator/supervisor training, internal unit coordination, analytic capabilities, local
government engagement, and cooperation by outside agencies and community organizations.
The purpose of this evaluation is to begin to identify specific strategy elements that might pose
implementation challenges for other agencies, and to consider how model adherence might
impact the effectiveness of the strategy.
For the current evaluation, three primary tasks associated with each implementation step are
listed. We briefly describe activities that occurred during the project planning phase, as well as
activities reported by the LVMPD PNI investigative unit that align with each task (Model
Adherence) and note any specific differences between these activities and activities carried out
by the CPD PNI investigative unit (Recommended Action). These differences, or recommended
actions, are noted strictly for future planning and implementation considerations. Table 4
provides a summary of the following narratives.
Step 1: Select Violent Micro-Locations
The PNI model suggests that sites should be selected for intervention based on a combination or
criteria, including (1) crime data analysis of gun-related violent crime concentrations, (2) input
from police personnel, and (3) local resources available to assist with neighborhood stabilization
and organic economic development.
Model Adherence: The LVMPD PNI site was selected with input from the LVMPD
Director of Crime Analysis who confirmed that the location was a persistent hot spot for gun22

related violent crime. Input concerning project viability in potential locations was solicited from
Captains, Deputy Chiefs, and Assistant Sheriffs during the site selection process. Careful
consideration was given to neighborhood resources during planning discussions, and the PNI site
was selected after identifying a location with local government and corporation-sponsored
initiatives that could help sustain and further develop neighborhood enhancements that occurred
as a result of the project.
Recommended Action: A more systematic and data-driven approach to site selection may
identify sites with higher concentrations of gun-related violence, thus allowing the strategy to
generate a larger impact on the overall number of crime events in a particular area command.6
Step 2: Select and Train PNI Unit
The (1) designation of a command-level project champion, (2) assembly and assignment of a
dedicated and skilled investigative team, and (3) a team of embedded support personnel,
including dedicated project managers, crime analysts, and legal personnel are necessary for
building an effective internal PNI team within the agency.
Model Adherence: The primary project champions included two Captains assigned to the
Northeast Area Command during the PNI project period. A team of police personnel, including a
Sergeant and four to six officers, was assigned to serve as a dedicated PNI investigative unit.
Crime analysis was performed, when requested, by an Area Command Intelligence Officer
(ACIO), LVMPD’s centralized crime analysis unit, or PNI investigators; and legal personnel
participated in PNI strategies when assistance was requested by the PNI unit.
Recommended Action: The initial project champion was an Assistant Sheriff who retired
before the launch of the project. A project champion regularly involved in the initiative at the
Assistant Sheriff level could facilitate a greater number of partnerships and help to address
potential obstacles (e.g., resources, internal unit coordination) encountered by the PNI
investigative unit. The PNI Sergeant had an extensive investigative background, while most of
the officers assigned to the unit were looking to gain such experience. LVMPD may consider
adding more experienced investigators to determine if this improves the unit’s performance.7 A
dedicated project manager and crime analyst, as well as embedded legal personnel may help to
improve unit performance.

6

The following section (Impact on Gun-Related Crime) suggests that the PNI strategy may have reduced crime in
the selected location, but the relatively low number of gun-related violent crime prior to PNI implementation did not
allow for a comprehensive assessment, given the 12-month post-intervention period.
7

LVMPD personnel indicated that including officers seeking investigative experience allowed the unit to recruit
highly productive and motivated members for the investigative team.
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Step 3: Establish and Follow Investigative Protocols
Effective investigative protocols for uncovering crime place networks include (1) undercover
and overt surveillance activities, (2) training and use of confidential informants (CIs), and (3)
identifying and interviewing additional sources of information.
Model Adherence: The PNI investigative unit reported using a wide array of undercover
and surveillance activities, beyond those initially used in previous PNI sites (e.g., PEN registers,
GPS tracking, law enforcement-sponsored UBER accounts). The PNI unit was also able to
leverage CIs and multiple sources of information, including security personnel and others
involved in the management and maintenance of PNI-focused locations.
Recommended Action: Future PNI activities could benefit from increased numbers of CIs
trained to report management activities that facilitate crime, as well as additional sources of
information (e.g., additional interviews with social service providers working in the area).
Step 4: Establish, Train, and Gain Compliance from PNI Investigative Board Members
A formal PNI Investigative Board that (1) is established and directed by the highest-ranking local
government officials, and includes (2) assigned personnel from each city/county department that
can direct or reallocate their respective agency resources to the project and (3) intra- and interjurisdictional law enforcement partners, should be trained to participate in PNI processes.
Model Adherence: Several partners, including the County Commissioner, county
department representatives, and other law enforcement agency representatives (local and federal)
expressed willingness to participate on a regular basis in the PNI process.
Recommended Action: Provide an initial training, and regularly scheduled on-going
training, for all selected PNI Board members to facilitate partner participation in the PNI
initiative.
Step 5: Gather Pre-Intelligence
Prior to the deployment of PNI investigators, a complete analysis of available intelligence and
information should be conducted. Analyses should include, but should not be limited to, a review
of (1) all available police records (e.g., calls-for-service, arrest, incident, and gang data); (2)
city/country, state, and federal records; (3) environmental surveys (e.g., blight index surveys or
CPTED assessments).
Model Adherence: Law enforcement records from local, county, state, and federal
agencies were reviewed, and partner information was leveraged throughout the course of the PNI
process.
Recommended Action: More comprehensive and structured record reviews and
information gathering activities that are guided by and grounded in crime science (e.g., journey
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to crime and field interview card analyses) prior to PNI initiation will provide investigators with
additional intelligence. This early intelligence could expedite the identification of potential
locations within the crime place network.
Step 6: Assess and Establish Intelligence Systems
To maximize the collection of information and organize investigative intelligence, previous PNI
processes included (1) routine documentation of PNI investigator activities, (2) creation of an
electronic case management system to identify offender networks and crime place networks, and
(3) partnerships to access to surveillance technologies.
Model Adherence: Formal documentation of PNI investigator activities was created on a
bi-weekly basis (at minimum). Documentation was stored electronically in folders accessible to
all unit members. The PNI unit also partnered with internal units (e.g., Central Intelligence Unit)
to secure needed surveillance technologies (e.g., covert/overt CCTV coverage), and with housing
managers to obtain access to existing surveillance feeds.
Recommended Action: Integration of social and place network analysis software could
help to manage and analyze information gathered by PNI investigators.
Step 7: Conduct Internal Intelligence Sessions
A critical component of the PNI process is information sharing, particularly between other
internal units and the PNI unit. To facilitate this process, regularly scheduled information sharing
or “intel” session should occur between the PNI unit and (1) patrol officers assigned to the area
and (2) other specialized units that have knowledge of offender activities in the area (e.g.,
gang/vice, violent crime, fraud units), and (3) regular briefings should be provided by the PNI
investigative unit to agency leadership.
Model Adherence: The PNI investigative unit regularly communicated with patrol
officers, specialized units, and LVMPD leadership – namely the NEAC Captain. Further, the
investigative unit distributed a special project bulletin requesting patrol officers’ assistance in
obtaining specific offender and place intelligence.
Recommended Action: Formal information sharing mechanisms, including regularly
scheduled intelligence sessions between officers and units (e.g., creating an internal PNI
Investigative Board), could further improve information sharing.
Step 8: Collect Community Intelligence
Residents and business owners in PNI sites can provide PNI investigators with information
leading to the identification of specific locations used by offenders within a crime place network.
Such information can be collected through (1) interviews with business and housing owners and
managers, (2) community interviews and surveys, and (3) community meetings.
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Model Adherence: The PNI investigative team conducted interviews with residents and
business owners during community meetings and during field operations. Community surveys
were also conducted.8
Recommended Action: Partner with organizations to conduct independent community
surveys to measure changes in community perceptions across time.
Step 9: Present Intelligence to PNI Investigative Board
A key element of the PNI strategy is regular interaction and information sharing between the
investigative unit and the PNI Investigative Board. These processes allow the police to leverage
city/county resources to alter place dynamics using interventions that would be difficult,
inefficient, or impossible to implement with available police resources. The PNI Investigative
Board should (1) meet formally on a regularly scheduled basis, (2) be staffed with members that
can directly control the allocation of specific city/county department resources, and (3)
incorporate members – both public and private – involved in economic development and
neighborhood resiliency efforts.
Model Adherence: A group of individuals, including the County Commissioner – and law
enforcement, county, and community partners met formally with the PNI investigative team on
one occasion during the project period (February 2019).
Recommended Action: Establish, under the direction of the County Commissioner, a
formal PNI Investigative Board should be scheduled to meet and review investigation
intelligence on a regular (e.g., bi-weekly) basis.
Step 10: Identify Offender and Crime Place Networks
The primary responsibility of PNI investigators is the identification of crime place networks. The
process of crime place network identification also allows investigators to identify connections
between offenders and offender groups that carry out illicit activities in these locations. An
effective PNI investigative team will work to uncover (1) place connectivity within the PNI site,
(2) connected places that fall outside of the initial site boundaries, and (3) offender networks
operating in these locations.
Model Adherence: The PNI investigative team identified a crime place network that
included all four crime places: crime sites, convergent settings, comfort spaces, and corrupting

8

Although limited in number (n=12) and not representative of all resident perceptions, a door-to-door survey was
used by the agency to establish contact with residents and begin to assess community concerns. LVMPD personnel
shared that, while crime and violence was the main community concern during the initial project phase, a subsequent
community meeting during the project period revealed that condominium residents’ primary concern was related to
parking issues at the complex.

26

spots. Figure 4 depicts a portion of this network.9 Places linked to the network beyond the initial
PNI site boundaries were also identified (e.g., a nearby motel). Primary offenders, and others
associated with the offenders, were identified during the investigative process.
Recommended Action: Social network analysis could identify larger offender networks
and allow investigators to better prioritize enforcement action.
Figure 4: Crime Place Network in NEAC

Step 11: Disrupt Offender and Crime Place Networks
To disrupt offender and crime place networks, PNI investigators must effectively (1) build cases
against owners and managers of locations in the crime place network, (2) build cases against
violent offenders operating in the area, and (3) permanently alter place dynamics to block
opportunities for violence.
Model Adherence: The PNI unit made targeted arrests, executed productive search
warrants – removing weapons and drugs – at comfort spaces, and built cases against prolific
offenders operating in the area. In partnership with HOA representatives, the PNI investigative
team altered place dynamics at the condominium complex in multiple ways (e.g., new HOA
rules for owners and tenants, as well as improved security, cameras and gates) and leveraged
oversight of a nearby market by external partners (e.g., code enforcement).
Recommended Action: Legal personnel embedded in PNI investigative unit activities
could help to build stronger cases against problematic owners and managers. Resources
associated with a formal PNI Investigative Board could be leveraged to more effectively and

9

Specific locations are approximate and do not represent specific addresses. It identifies potential crime sites (red
circle), convergent settings (grey circle), comfort spaces (blue circles), and corrupting spots (green circle). The red
“X” indicates a location linked to the network by a specific owner/manager found to be engaged in illegal housing
practices.
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quickly address challenging place and social dynamics, such as those found within the fourplex
housing location.
Table 4: PNI Model Adherence and Recommended Action Summary
Step/Task
Model Adherence
Recommended Action
1. Select violent micro-locations
Data-driven
Director of Crime Analysis input
Formal city-wide gun-violence analysis
Police input
Command staff input
--Local resource identification Considered in site selection
--2. Select and train PNI unit
Project champion
NEAC Captains
Assistant Sheriff involvement
Dedicated/skilled unit
Experienced Sergeant
Incorporate skilled investigators
Support personnel
Leveraged external resources
Embed personnel in unit
3. Establish and follow investigative protocols
Undercover/surveillance
Numerous innovative activities
--Trained CIs
CI involvement
Expand training and number of CIs
Sources of information
Contact with multiple sources
Consider additional sources
4. Establish, train, and gain compliance from PNI Investigative Board members
County Commissioner
Willing to participate
Establish PNI Investigative Board
Assigned department heads
Direct assignment by Commissioner
Informal cooperation gained
Jurisdictional partners
Training for all partners
5. Gather pre-intelligence
Police record analysis
Conducted on an on-going basis
Complete prior to project initiation
External record analysis
Environmental surveys
Informal assessments conducted
Establish formal evaluations
6. Assess and establish intelligence systems
PNI activity documentation
Formal bi-weekly documentation
--Electronic case management Accessible files
Formal network analysis
Surveillance access
Partnerships to leverage technologies
--7. Conduct internal intelligence sessions
Patrol sessions
Information sharing/bulletins
Formalized sessions
Specialized unit sessions
Informal information sharing
Leadership briefings
Regular briefings to NEAC Captain
--8. Collect community intelligence
Owner/manager interviews
--Resident interviews/surveys Conducted by PNI investigative unit
Leverage partners to conduct surveys
Community meetings
--9. Present intelligence to products to PNI Investigative Board
Formal/scheduled meetings
Ad hoc board meeting held
Appropriate board staffing
--Regular meetings with formal board
Economic development
--10. Identify offender and crime place networks
Site place connectivity
Identified crime place network
--External place connectivity
Identified external network locations
--Offender networks
Identified key offenders/associates
Formal social network analysis
11. Disrupt offender and crime place networks
Build owner/manager cases
Identified manager involved in network Embed legal personnel
Build violent offender cases Targeted enforcement
--Alter place dynamics
Physical changes and place oversight
Leverage board resources
- - - = no specific process improvement recommendations
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Impact on Gun-Related Crime
The primary goals of the current evaluation are to describe the PNI strategy as implemented by
LVMPD and examine general model adherence to the strategy implemented by CPD, as
presented in the previous sections. However, here we also note the early impact of the project on
gun-related crime and consider the outcome within the context of the process evaluation results
in the discussion section that follows.10 The results presented should be viewed and interpreted
with caution. The 12-month post-intervention evaluation period may be insufficient to detect
meaningful results associated with the PNI strategy, given the small geographic boundaries of
the PNI site (see Hammer, 2020). Further, differences across CPD and LVMPD PNI sites and
jurisdictional contexts should be considered when comparing outcomes across agencies.
We compared the number of gun-related offenses that occurred during the 12-month period after
the LMVPD PNI investigative team began their work in the selected location to the number of
gun-related offenses that occurred during the 12-month period prior to the start of the PNI
initiative. Table 5 shows that the number of gun-related offenses declined by 39.1 percent
following the implementation of the PNI strategy.11
Table 5: PNI Impact on Gun-related Violent Offenses
Gun-related Offenses

# Pre-intervention

# Post-intervention

% Change

23

14

-39.1

Further analyses examined a possible differential treatment effect by location. Table 6 reveals the
number of offenses reported for each location within the PNI site. The data show that the number
of gun-related offenses declined across all three locations. However, caution should be exercised
when interpreting percent change values based on small numbers. These values are reported here
for general comparison purposes, but future analyses based on a longer post-intervention period
are required to confidently determine whether the strategy proved more effective at reducing
gun-related violence at particular types of locations.
Table 6: PNI Impact on Gun-related Violent Offenses by Location
Location

# Pre-intervention

# Post-intervention

% Change

Condominiums

8

4

-50.0%

Strip Mall

3

2

-33.3%

Fourplex Housing

12

8

-33.3%

10

This presentation of crime incident data serves to inform the participating agency and does not represent a formal
empirical evaluation of the project. Future evaluations could be strengthened by examining multiple PNI
intervention sites over a longer post-intervention period with matched control sites for comparison purposes.
11

No formal significance tests were conducted given the small number of offenses.
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VI.

DISCUSSION

The LVMPD PNI strategy was implemented as part of a combination of strategies used to reduce
gang-member involved violence. Agency command staff elected to implement the PNI strategy
in a single site, historically linked to gun-related gang violence in LVMPD’s Northeast Area
Command. Given the relatively recent development of PNI, the project was implemented with
the goal of documenting the PNI investigative activities and process outcomes as part of a pilot
project. Our evaluation of this pilot project was designed to review and describe LVMPD PNI
investigative activities and assess the degree to which the agency was able to implement specific
elements of the program.
A PNI investigative unit was assembled and assigned to the selected site. Following an initial
training provided by the research team to investigators and internal/external PNI partners, a
Sergeant assigned to the project led a team of officers to investigate offender and crime place
networks in the target location. The PNI investigative unit identified key offenders and a set of
locations that formed a crime place network within the site. The unit engaged in surveillance and
intelligence gathering, external agency coordination and partnership building, effecting changes
to physical locations and place management practices, and enforcement actions. On-going
technical assistance was coordinated by the research team throughout the project. Documentation
of PNI investigation activities and crime data were reviewed after 12-months of PNI strategy
implementation.
Our interpretation of the program review and process evaluation findings can best be
summarized as follows:
1) The LVMPD PNI investigative unit was highly productive in the targeted location. The
wide variety of activities described in the program review reveal that, while traditional
enforcement efforts were used to incapacitate or deter key offenders, the unit was also
successful in building partnerships and changing both physical and social place
dynamics. These partnerships and place-based changes focused on altering violencefacilitating dynamics and may lessen the need for future traditional police response or
justice system intervention.
2) The LVMPD PNI investigative unit developed systems and processes that allowed
implementation of the vast majority of PNI strategy elements. Overall, PNI model
compliance was high. The unit addressed each implementation step through their
investigative actions. The unit also expanded or improved upon Cincinnati PNI strategy
processes across several implementation dimensions (e.g., innovative surveillance tactics,
creative intelligence sharing processes).
3) To improve PNI strategy processes and effectiveness, the most critical recommended
actions fall within four categories:
1. leverage the influence of a project champion at the highest rank possible;
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2. conduct additional formal analyses and intelligence gathering prior to site
selection and throughout the PNI project;
3. assign additional dedicated personnel to the PNI investigative unit
activities (e.g., crime analyst, legal personnel, project manager); and
4. establish a formal PNI Investigative Board led by city/county government
representatives to regularly review PNI findings.
4) Although project limitations did not permit a comprehensive outcome evaluation, postintervention changes in crime incidents numbers suggest that the PNI strategy may have
contributed to a decrease in gun-related violent crime the in targeted site.
Policy Implications
The results of this study were presented by members of the research team to the LVMPD
command staff in November 2019. Several research and policy implications were discussed at
this meeting. These issues are relevant for both LVMPD officials and the larger law enforcement
field.
First, the activities conducted by the PNI investigative team appear to have significantly altered
place dynamics, particularly at the condominium complex. Site observations and discussions
with property employees conducted by the research team supported investigative documentation
suggesting that the project increased residents’ perceptions of safety. Several other quality of life
indicators (e.g., increased housing values, discussions between government leaders and Nellis
Air Force Base regarding housing military personnel in the area) demonstrated evidence of
neighborhood improvement following PNI implementation. As such, PNI, as implemented in Las
Vegas, holds promise for reducing gun-related crime and improving residents’ quality of life.
Second, although not the primary focus of the current evaluation, the decrease in gun-related
violent crime appears less dramatic in Las Vegas than the decreases observed in Cincinnati
following PNI strategy implementation. There are two plausible explanations for this difference.
First, numbers of shootings and gun-related violent crime were higher prior to implementation in
the Cincinnati sites than in the Las Vegas site. A Las Vegas location with a higher concentration
of violence, or a site with a larger project boundary and more crime events, might have
experienced a more dramatic decline. Second, the Cincinnati PNI strategy effectively leveraged
the resources of the PNI Investigative Board. It is recommended that LVMPD work to establish
this board before replicating this strategy in additional sites to enhance PNI strategy
effectiveness and further lessen reliance on traditional criminal justice interventions.
Third, to fully assess the impact of the PNI strategy on gun-related violent crime, it is necessary
to implement the program across multiple sites for a sufficient period of time. We do not yet
know how contextual factors influence PNI strategy effectiveness. Implementing the strategy
across sites that differ along physical (e.g., single family versus multifamily housing) and social
(e.g., resident demographics) dimensions, as well as across multiple jurisdictional contexts (e.g.,
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large metropolitan areas versus smaller urban cities) will help to determine when and where the
PNI strategy is mostly likely to have the largest impact on crime. We have yet to assess potential
displacement or diffusion of crime control benefits, or how these effects might vary across
contexts. Further, it can take months to identify and implement PNI strategy interventions likely
to produce long-term effects – like the HOA bylaw changes described in previous sections.
Therefore, post-intervention assessment periods should be designed to consider the lagged effect
of PNI strategy interventions.
While PNI is a relatively new strategy, it appears to offer a promising new approach to violent
crime reduction. We remain cautiously optimistic about the potential of this approach to reduce
gun-related violent crime in historically violent locations. Further evaluation is necessary to
properly assess the impact of the PNI strategy on residents, businesses, police agencies, local
governments, and the larger justice system.
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